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THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT:




In this paper we introduce a cash flow model with float to manage core issues in Corporate
Finance. The float actually removes current hindrances pervading the standard cash flow
model. To start with, we derive the float model and uncover its underlying financial
engineering. After that, any investment decision is regarded as a synthetic portfolio made
out of a revenue bond financing the investment, and a performance swap acting as a value
driver. It is within the performance swap where the float lies and enhances value. Furthermore,
extension to valuation is provided taking advantage of the former portfolio approach. Next,
the float complex structure is displayed to proceed towards its sources and uses of cash
flows. Last of all, we expand upon a normative model which makes the most of the float and
spells out how an accountability precept should be functional in redressing agency problems.
JEL:  G30 , G34  G32
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I. Introduction
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shareholders, bondholders and managers, within a financial framework, was
that of Jensen y Meckling (1976). Ten years later, it was Jensen again (1986)
who called attention on managers discretionary power when dealing with
free cash flows. Several undertakings to provide empirical evidence to
Jensen’s statements have been advanced since: Mann-Sicherman (1991),
Crutchley-Hansen (1989), Jensen (1997) and Apreda (1998,1999c). Research
on financial contracts as a way of coping with agency problems was led by
Barnea-Haugen-Senbet  (1985); on the same track Anderson-Sundaresan
(1996) proves useful. At the 1998 Eastern Finance Association Meeting, an
empirical paper by Howton-Perfect (1998)  highlighted relevant features not
only about market responses after debt issuances, but also the consequences
on free cash flows as well. On the other hand, lately books on Corporate
Finance (see References) devote at least a chapter to the Cash Flow Model,
a suitable tool for companies valuation, capital budgeting, and also financial
assets valuation.
Jensen’s approach was remarkable and conceptually deep, bringing about
a model which frames relationships among Firm Theory, Management
Behavior, Agency Problems, and Mergers-Acquisitions Issues. However, it
didn’t address operative and quantitative issues. It is our first objective in
this paper to build up an operative model that we are going to call the “cash-
flow float management model” or simply the “float model”. A recent attempt
to introduce a float model into Agency Theory can be found in Apreda (1998);
either accountancy or financial related issues with the float model are dealt
with in Apreda (1999a).
As regards as the standard Cash Flows Model, we feel that it actually
fails to provide flexible mechanisms and procedures to decision making; not
even displays the rich structure cash flows really have. It is our second
objective in this paper to expand the standard Cash Flows Model so as to
sort out those problems managers breed when arbitraging the float on behalf
of their personal agendas.THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 249
II. The Standard Cash Flow Model
For any business firm it holds, at every moment “t”,
DCFt (brought about by assets) = DCFt (delivered to debtholders) +
+ DCFt (delivered to stockholders)          (1)
or, briefly,
DCFt (assets) = DCFt (debtholders) + DCFt (stockholders)          (2)
the message this relationship conveys seems clear: incremental cash flows
stemming from assets are carried over both debtholders and stockholders to
be fully distributed between them. We will proceed to derive it from the
incremental balance for cash flows.
D  Assets  =  D Liabilities  +  D Owners’equity          (3)
Firstly, we recall that current and fixed assets main components, in terms
of incremental cashflows can be stated as:
D Assets = D Cash + D Marketable Securities + D Accounts Receivable +
+ D Inventories + D Other Current Assets + D Fixed Assets -
- Depreciation (period)          (4)
all variables in (4) are flows. Some of them come out of stock variables
increments between valuations at the beginning and end of each period.
Others are flow variables themselves, as it is the case of depreciation, forJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 250
instance. This remark also applies to some relationships hereinafter. In turn,
liabilities and owner’s equity amount to:
D Liabilities + D Owners’equity = D Current Liabilities +
+ D Long-term Liabilities + D Stock + Retained Earnings (period)
Next task consists of linking both retained earnings and earnings before
interest and taxes, through net income from that period:
Retained Earnings (period) + Dividends(period) = Net Income =
= EBIT(period) - Interest(long-term debt period) - Taxes(period)
furthermore,
Retained Earnings (period) = EBIT(period) - Interest(long-term debt period) -
- Taxes(period) - Dividends(period)          (5)
As the reader might have realized, Interest (long-term debt) is gross,
exclusive of tax deduction. The Standard Cash Flow Model follows this
procedure because interest is an outgoing cash flow to bondholders on a
gross basis. At the same time, the company improves its cash flows from
operations taking advantage of a tax deduction which it seems sensible to
keep it, therefore, on the cash flows from assets.  In the case of interest on
short-term liabilities, the standard cash flow model leaves them above the
EBIT line in the Income Statement.
As from now, we will drop the “period” marker because it comes out
directly from the context. On the other hand, liabilities and owners’s equity
structure can be broken out this way:THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 251
D Liabilities + D Owners’equity = D Accounts Payable +
+ D Short-term Notes Payable + D Other Current Liabilities +
+ D Net New Debt - Principal Repayments + D Net New Stock + EBIT -
- Interest(long-term debt) - Taxes - Dividends          (6)
By net new debt, we mean:
D Net New Debt = New Debt Issues (during period) -
- Debt Repurchase (during period)
From a financial point of view, changes in stocks come from differences
between new issues and stock repurchases along the period, that is to say:
D Net New  Stock = New Stock Issues (during period) -
- Stock Repurchase (during period)          (7)
subtracting the second line in (6) from the second line in (4), we attain the
net change in working capital. After some arrangements among the
components in (4) and (6) it follows that
EBIT + Depreciation - Taxes - D Working Capital - D Fixed Assets =
= Interest(long-term debt) + Principal Repayments - D Net New Debt +
+ Dividends - D Net New Stock                                                                    (8)JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 252
There is broad agreement that the operative or disposable cash flows in
the period is the remainder of EBIT after subtracting taxes expenses, and
adding  depreciation which, in fact, is not a real cash expense. For this reason,
it is defined an incremental cash flow coming out of this remainder:
DCF(operative) = EBIT + Depreciation - Taxes          (9)
However, these cash flows shouldn’t be fully distributed between
stakeholders. Otherwise, the company wouldn’t be able to survive, because
of lacking provisions either to replenish working capital or in granting the
maintenance of his fixed assets. That’s why the net operative cash flows,
after such provisions, are the only real cash flows that all assets bring about.
Hence, from (8) and dating the cash flows variables,
DCFt (assets) = D CFt (operative) - D CFt (working capital) -
- D CFt (fixed assets)                                                                                  (10)
In the corporate valuation literature, these  DCFt (assets)  are  frequently
called “free cash flows”. We  will  expand  on  this  issue  later  in Section XI.
Working now with (9), we  can pick  up  those  items  delivered  to  debtholders,
DCFt (debtholders) = DCFt (interest long-term debt) - DCFt (net new debt) +
+  Principal Repayments                                                                           (11)
by the same token,
DCFt (stockholders) = DCFt (dividends) - DCFt (net new stock)             (12)
this ends with the derivation of the so called Cash Flow Model, which states:THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 253
DCFt (brought about by assets) = DCFt (delivered to debtholders) +
+ DCFt (delivered to stockholders)
as from now, we are going to give incremental symbols even to flow variables
as this seems convenient to our further development.
III. The Cash Flow Model with Float
In a formal setting, the Cash Flow Model makes a claim in (1) that amounts
to a complete and exhaustive allocation of cash flows from assets to
debtholders and stockholders. Under this assumption, the model encompasses
what seems to us a removable flaw that hinders its ability to come in handily
with real problems. Let’s go deeply into this issue, by making the following
remarks:
- Distributing all resources to stakeholders is not desirable because such
decisions uncover lacking of growth purposes and failure at hedging risk.
- It doesn’t seem wise, as regards investing or financial innovation, to be
left without any freedom to find out likely favourable chances in relevant
markets.
- The Standard Model makes no room for core financial decisions:
reorganization, incentives, mergers, acquisitions, financial risk
management, new investments, research and development, credit risk
management, and corporate governance .
- It is well known that managers could be tempted into committing executive
decisions on behalf of their own personal agendas. In other words,
bringing forth agency problems and costs.
 Weighing up advantages and disadvantages of the standard model, we
feel that there would be latitude for improvement if we introduced a floatJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 254
cash flow model. As from now, we are going to deal with this expanded
version, which will be called the ”Cash Flow Model with Float”.
DCFt (brought about by assets) = DCFt (delivered to debtholders) +
+ DCFt (delivered to stockholders) + DCFt (float)        (13)
It’s worth now focusing on (13) by giving attention to some details,
because it is the starting point to provide the float with foundations. If we
used the Standard Cash Flow Model as it were a Cash Flows Statement, on
ex-post basis, the float should be obviously equal to zero,
DCFt (float) = 0
but if we attempted to use the Standard Cash Flows Model on ex-ante basis,
as needed in Corporate Finance, we would face five relevant facts:
(a) Cash flows from assets depend on growth rates to be forecasted item by
item.
(b) Expected cash flows to existing debt and stock are easier to assess than
those of assets, and we can take advantages of equilibrium valuation
models as benchmarks for valuing financial assets.
(c) Therefore, cash flows from assets, and those to debtholders and
stockholders, do not necessarily balance as required by the standard
model.
(d) Unless there were neither value creation nor value destruction, the float
should be significative, that is to say,
DCFt (float) ¹ 0
(e) It is with the float inclusion, on ex-ante basis, that cash flows balance by
and large.THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 255
in the following sections we are going to develop the underlying financial
engineering of the float model.
IV. Cash Flows from Assets: The Investment Decision
Let us consider any single investment decision as rendered by an
investment project, which takes vectorial structure:
F = <  - F0 ; F1 ; F2 ;  .........; FN   >                                                           (14)
The initial component can be assimilated to the upfront cash deployment
for the project, whereas the remaining components, in general, can be looked
upon as positive. It’s not so uncommon that some of the future expected
cash flows might be negative. A sensible explanation is that time comes up
when reinvestments, partial renewals, or maintenance expenses overtake
incoming cash flows for that period. On the other hand, available techniques
allow for changing cash flows patterns, by making investment periods shorter
or longer along the chosen investment horizon. Hence, we can assume in
(14) that cash flows are all positive, but for the initial one. If any cash flow
remained negative, the matching vectorial component would take the negative
sign eventually.
By discounting cash flows vector components backwards to the valuation
moment (“t=0”) we are led to the investment net present value:
NPV [F; k] = å 1 £ t  £ N  DCFt  ´   < 1 + k >- t
   -  F0                                                     (15)
if the project present value were positive, the project should qualify to become
elegible eventually. We can relate the net present value with cash flows from
the assets involved in the project:
NPV [F; k] = å 1 £ t  £ N    DCFt (assets)  ´  < 1 + k >- t
    -   F0                   (16)JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 256
V. Cash Flows to Debtors, Stockholders and Float
The investment decision funding involves an allocation of cash flows,
either to dividends, interest or principal repayments, according to the debt-
capital mix the company has finally chosen. Let us work a little with the
financing cash flows in (11) and (12), so as to pave the way for an
interpretation of net present value that will prove suitable for our aims.
Starting with cash flows to debtholders, as in (11),
DCFt (debtholders) = DCFt (interest long-term debt) - DCFt (net new debt) +
+ DCFt (principal repayments)
we reach to,
DCFt (debtholders) = DCFt (interest on investment debt) +
+ DCFt (principal repayments on investment debt) +
+ DCFt (other debtholders)                                                                      (17)
In this way, debt is broken down into interest and principal payments
primarily engaged with the investment decision, whereas any other debt cash
flows not engaged with the investment decision is kept apart. Let us take a
closer look to cash flows committed  with “other debts”.
DCFt (other debtholders) = DCFt (standing debt period, principal repayments) +
+ DCFt (standing debt period, interest payments) -
- DCFt (net new debt during period)                                                         (18)THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 257
by “standing debt” we mean that debt which has nothing to do with the
likely financing of the single project. Dealing with stocks in a similar way,
we can start with (12) and proceed to,
DCFt (stockholders) = DCFt (dividends) - DCFt (net new stock)
and this can be set forth as :
DCFt (stockholders) = DCFt (dividends on investment) +
+ DCFt (other stockholders)                                                                      (19)
those cash flows eventually forwarded to “other stockholders” can be framed
as:
DCFt (other stockholders) = DCFt (other stock dividends  period) -
- DCFt (net new stock)        (20)
VI. A Portfolio Approach for Valuing Financing Cash Flows and
Float
Now, we are ready to exclude those cash flows which fund the investment
decision from those that add economic value to the firm. Starting at (16):
NPV [F ; k] = å1 £ t  £ N   DCFt (assets)   ´  < 1 + k >- t
 - F0
and using (13),
NPV [F ; k] = å1 £ t  £ N  {DCFt(debtholders) + DCFt(stockholders) +
+ DCFt(float)} ´ <1+ k>-t
   - F 0JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 258
now we put (17) and (19) in this relationship to get,
NPV [F ; k ] = [å {DCFt (interest on investment debt) +
+ DCFt (dividends on investment debt) +
+ DCFt (principal repayments on investment debt )} ´ <1+ k>- t
   - F0 ] +
+ å {DCFt (float) + DCFt (other debtholders) +
+ DCFt (other stockholders)} ´ <1+ k >- t        (21)
further, we can match (21) with the net present value of the following
portfolio:
P = { revenue bond (RB); performance swap (PS) }
Cash flows in (21) are thus mapped to a pair of synthetic financial cash
flow vectors. The first one is mapped to a revenue bond, the other one to a
performance swap. That is to say:
{ DCFt (interest) + DCFt (dividends ) + DCFt (principal } Þ  RB
{ DCFt (float) + DCFt (other debt) + DCFt (other stock)} Þ  PS
as from now, we can ease the notation and, instead of writing down,
DCFt (interest on investment debt) or DCFt (other stockholders)
we will do it as,
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whenever the context leaves no room for vagueness. Briefly, we have defined
a synthetic portfolio to duplicate the cash flow stemming from financing and
floating.
VII. Analysis of the Revenue Bond (RB)
Formally, we define the “revenue bond” , RB, as the cash flows vector:
RB = < RB1 ; RB2 ; ....... ; RBN  >
where the vector components, as from “t = 1” are
RBt = DCFt (interest) + DCFt (dividends) + DCFt (principal)        (22)
that is to say, this bond stems from revenues that the investment decision
should provide for its own funding. In the case of debt it deals with interest
and principal payments. As for stocks, it deals with the stream of expected
future dividends which could be forecasted by some valuation model.  The
revenue bond net present value is given by:
PV( RB ; k ) = å  RBt  ´   < 1 + k > - t
 = å {DCFt (interest) +
+ DCFt (dividends) + DCFt (principal}  ´  < 1 + k >- t
                                                   (23)
although these cash flows come from those generated by the whole set of
assets, they are only devoted to the investment repayment. In this case, the
cost of capital rate performs as the internal rate of return for the performance
bond. Therefore, it follows,
PV( RB ; k ) = F 0
In most capital markets there are, in fact, plenty of real revenue bondsJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 260
issued by municipal government, federal agencies and, to a lesser extent,
corporations. It is for the issuers to grant debt payments with their own net
revenues. Within an “asset-liability management” approach, it seems
consistent to take the cash flows from a single investment project as a synthetic
revenue bond. Topical applications and deep analysis on bond markets can
be found in a recent book by Sundaresan (1997). The last component in the
revenue bond deserves further qualification: we should add to the last
expected dividend the expected terminal value of that dividend. Bearing in
mind this remark, and by means of standard stocks valuation models, the
whole revenue bond can be shaped as a floating rate bond eventually.
VIII. Analysis of the Performance Swap (PS)
By the same token, we define a “performance swap”, PS, as the cash
flows vector:
PS = <  PS1 ; PS2 ; ....... ;  PSN  >
this swap is defined by a contingency on the performance of the investment
decision:
(a) If net present value in (16) were positive, then the swap pay-offs would
amount to:
PSt =  DCFt (float) + DCFt (other debt) + DCFt (other stock)                  (24)
in this case, there should be economic value created by the investment project
through that period.
(b) If net present value in (16) were negative, then the swap pay-offs ought
to balance the gap between the financial side of the project and its net
present value, that is:THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 261
PSt = DCFt (assets) - RBt  = DCFt (assets) - { DCFt (interest)
+ DCFt (dividends) +  DCFt (principal) }        (25)
Hence, there would not follow any economic value added. In fact, this
could convey actual destruction of company’s value through that period. If
(16) becomes negative, then the swap has to bridge the gap, by financing the
investment project. But if (16) were negative it wouldn’t follow that each
component of its cash flow vector is less than zero. That’s why it is convenient
to highlight such a contingency straight down to components, period by
period. If the investment decision is on the planning stage, the pay-offs could
be zero. That means that the project is rejected. In this case, the swap would
become assimilated to a single-period option that is not exercised.
From a financial engineering point of view, this performance swap takes
after the customary interest rate vanilla swap, in which both counterstreams
exchange floating indexes. The company and the investment project will
play as counterparts. To conclude on this section, the swap present value
comes as:
PV(PS ; k) = å  PSt  ´  < 1 + k >- t  = å { DCFt (float) + DCFt (other debt) +
+ DCFt (other stock)} ´ < 1 + k > - t
                                                                         (26)
IX. Firm Valuation and Portfolio Approach
Through Sections VI to VIII, net present value was split up into present
values coming from a revenue bond and a performance swap, for a given flat
cost of capital rate. If  we take into account the temporal structure of interest
rates, we should need a vector
K = <  k1 ; k2 ; k3 ; ...... ; kt  ; ...... ; kN   >JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 262
whose components stand for cost of capital rates, which can be assessed by
temporal structure of rates of interest and credit risk premiums for bonds,
and risk adjusting equilibrium model for stock. Hence, by means of (16), we
reach:
F0  = [ å { DCFt (interest) + DCFt (dividends) + DCFt (principal) }  ´
´ < 1 + kt > - t] + å { DCFt (float) + DCFt (other debt) +
+ DCFt (other stock)}  ´ < 1 + kt > - t        (27)
The first summation symbol refers to the revenue bond inclusive of
temporal structure of rates of interest. The second summation symbol conveys
the performance swap inclusive of term structure as well. Both synthetic
financial to be valued at t = 0. Next step consists of departing from the context
of a single investment decision to reach to general case where the whole
firm can be assimilated to a complex investment decision. Therefore, in the
float model setting, the value of a firm V [E; k], comes up as:
V [E ; k] = å  1 £ t  £ N      DCFt (assets)  ´  < 1 + kt > - t                   (28)
and, by means of the float,
V [E ; k] = å { DCFt (debt) + DCFt (stock) + DCFt (float)}  ´ < 1 + kt >- t
If we profit from our development in Section VI, by using relationships
[26]
V [E ; k] = å  { DCFt (interest) + DCFt (dividends) +
+ DCFt (principal)  }  ´ < 1 +  kt >- t
  + å { DCFt (float) + DCFt (other debt) +
+ DCFt (other stock) }  ´ < 1 +  kt >-  tTHE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 263
but here further qualifications have to be made on “other stock” and “other
debt”. As we face the whole firm, we must bear in mind that now the cash flows
directed to “other debt” reduces only to cash flows directed to “net new debt”:
DCFt (other debt) = - DCFt (net new debt)                   (29)
This is easy to understand if we recall (18) for a single investment decision.
In the context of the whole firm, payments and interest from standing debt
allocate in the revenue bond because they are, as investment decisions, “assets-
in-place”. Doing likewise with “other stockholders” and recalling (20):
DCFt (other stock) = - DCFt (net new stock)                   (30)
summing up, we have:
V [E ; k] = å { DCFt (interest) + DCFt (dividends) +
+ DCFt (principal)  }  ´ < 1 + k >- t
  +  å { DCFt (float)  -
- DCFt (net new debt) - DCFt (net new stock) } ´  < 1 + kt >- t
            (31)
in this way, the company’s value comes up as the net present value of both a
revenue bond and a performance swap. In the first place, the bond’s present
value measures the value from those actual cash flows which actually finance
the company’s assets in place.
PV( RB ; k ) = å { DCFt (interest) + DCFt (dividends) +
+ DCFt (principal) } ´ < 1 + k >- t
          (32)
In the second place, the performance swap measures the value from future
investment projects that strategic decisions bring about through the floatJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 264
management, and those cash flows going to other debt and other stock.
PV(PS ; k) = å { DCFt (float) - DCFt (net new debt)  -
- DCFt (net new stock) }  ´ < 1 + kt >-t
                                                                            (33)
At this point, a reference to the Economic Value Added (EVA) model
seems unavoidable, although among scholars there are mixed feelings about
EVA qualifications. To get a picture on this issue, it sounds advisable to split
up EVA’s likely contributions into two directions: firstly, as a performance
measure model, it provides managers with a suitable benchmark which has
been successfully used, and abused, by them. Therefore, whether EVA’s is
good or bad becomes a matter of personal choice and convenience eventually.
Secondly, as a valuation model, there is strong criticism from the scholars’
field. Professor Damodaran (1999) acts as a remarkable representative of
them when states in his paper “Value Creation and Enhancement” that EVA
would convey nothing more valuable or innovative than cash flows valuations
hadn’t taken into account earlier.
X. Float Structure and Corporate Governance
As we established elsewhere, Apreda (1998, 1999a) the float exhibits a
complex structure:
DCFt (float) = DCFt (sunk costs) + DCFt (strategic investments) +
+ DCFt (fixed assets replacement) + DCFt (tight budget constraint) +
+ DCFt (incentives) +  DCFt (rate of interest risk) +
+ DCFt (foreign exchange risk) + DCFt  (commodities risk) +
+ DCFt (credit risk) ) + DCFt (bonds covenants)                   (34)THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 265
Let us highlight its most important features, because they amount to
corporate governance issues:
A. Sinking Fund for Sunk Costs: D D D D DCFt (Sunk Costs)
Because sunk costs coming from any investment project are not
incremental cash flows for that project, they should not be taken into account
for that project valuation. How are sunk costs then financed? In recent
Corporate Finance textbooks, we find this sort of statement as a rule of thumb:
“it is the firm which funds any investment project sunk costs with the net
present value from the succesful investment projects”. It is the float the most
suitable place to allocate this sinking fund.
B. Strategic Investment Decisions: D D D D DCFt (Strategic Investments)
Strategic investment cash flows convey a manifold structure whose main
components are:
DCFt (strategic investments) = DCFt (future diversifications) +
+ DCFt (future mergers and acqusitions) + DCFt (future reorganizations) +
+ DCFt (future capital investments) + DCFt (going private decisions)   (35)
All these items bring pressure to bear on strategic decisions and it is for
the float to deal with them. The float, eventually, shows itself as the key for
value enhancement. The “going private decisions” component means three
main alternative choices: private placements of debt and stock, “delisting”
standing debt or stock and, eventually, leveraged buy-outs. A useful discussion
on private placements in the United States seems to be Carey et al. (1993).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 266
C. Sinking Fund to Capital Assets Replacement: D D D D DCFt (Fixed Assets
Replacement)
It is a widespread practice to allow for fixed assets consumption by writing
off periodic amounts from books as depreciation charges against each period.
When the replacement time comes up eventually, it is assumed that a new
investment project must be undertaken. Against the conventional wisdom,
we should manage a sinking fund to match on due schedule any replacement
need. Where may those resources come from? From the float, and by means
of a portfolio of financial assets built up with float allocations. These cash
flows, however, have nothing to do with the cash flows provisions to fixed
assets for each period that the standard model requires as a way of planning
maintenance of fixed assets in the realm of tactical decisions. Instead, we
are interested here in strategic decisions regarding future capital budgeting.
D. Sinking Fund for Tight Budget Constraint: D D D D DCFt (Tight Budget
Constraint)
This is quite a sensitive float component to agency costs because managers
may allocate their positive balances to substandard projects so as to avoid
dividends distribution or, still worse, to get rid of the capital markets
monitoring just in case good prospective projects were to be financed by
debt issues. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assimilate these
strategic cash flows to those the standard model leaves aside to meet working
capital needs for any period. A remark, likewise that we made on fixed assets
replacement, seems sensible here. Furthermore, this sinking fund can be built
out of a portfolio of financial assets.
Latest academic work highlights the consequences of soft budget
constraint in corporate finance and mainly in newly privatized companies
around the world, which bring about plenty of interesting agency problems.
For instance, Lin-Tan (1999), Maskin (1999), work with transitional
economies; Rajan and Zingales (1998) on the governance of the newTHE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 267
enterprise, also Apreda (1999c) on capital market and corporate governance
in Argentina.
E. Sinking Fund for Management and Directors’ Motivation through
Issuance of Financial Assets: D D D D DCFt (Incentives)
This item conveys a sensitive political meaning in corporate finance
governance, mainly when the Board of Directors work on behalf of the CEO.
Financial Engineering is frequently used to provide management with
incentives. The main instruments are warrants over stock, convertible bonds,
or selling of stock contingent upon performance. Still a good point for this
issue is Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1985). On corporate governance, Monks-
Minow (1995) seems still to be the best from the active stakeholders’ side. A
provocative analysis on independent directors is provided by Clutterbuck
and Waine (1994).
F. Risk Management: D D D D DCFt (Interest Rate Risk), D D D D DCFt (Commodities
Risk), D D D D DCFt (Credit Risk), D D D D DCFt (Foreign Exchange Risk)
Either transactional or economic risk profiles threaten companies all
around the world. This is a growing concern and commits huge volumes of
traded financial derivatives to hedge financial risks. Awareness on risk
management has been broadening as long as the economy becomes global
and interdependent; a good source is Smith-Smithson-Willford (1995). Credit
risk ought to be definitely regarded as a float component because likely
changes in credit ratings can backfire on the company’s expected cash flows.
G. Sinking Fund  for Bonds Covenants: D D D D DCFt (Bonds Covenants)
Covenants usually draw a boundary to management power, by limiting
their decision making. We can give some examples to show the way this canJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 268
be accomplished: the company is not able to buy or sell certain assets, it
can’t enter in merger or acquisitions processes, it must keep some financial
ratios within predetermined strips of values, it ought not to issue new bonds,
it must not improve the incentives system, and so on. All these limitations
hold true until bonds maturity, and are contingent upon debtholders further
agreements. A useful survey on this subject is Smith-Warnes (1979). For the
last two decades, private placements and institutional investors activism have
included sinking funds when issuing bonds, aimed to play on the investors’
safest side. Good research on private placement is to be found in Carey et al.
(1993).
XI. Float Sources and Uses
Where do float components come from? Where do float components go
to eventually? To uncover this dynamics we suggest to look upon the float as
a strategic decision-making centre. As such, the float manages its own sources
and application of cash flows, on intertemporal basis. Let us pick up an
example, supposing we need to sink funds to meet a future asset replacement:
a) Cash flows from assets, exclusive of cash flows already committed to
stakeholders, may provide us with resources to set aside for installments.
That is to say, we would build up a sinking fund.
b) If that were not possible, we would draft a future allocation of resources
by means of  new debt or new stock issuances.
Last of all, there are many ways of building up floats. Two fully developed
examples can be found in Apreda (1999a). Next figure shows the float sources
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DCFt - a (Net New Debt)
D CFt - c (operative)
D CFt - b (Net New Stock)
D CFt (float)
D CFt + d (operative)
D CFt + e  (Fixed Assets) D CFt + f (Working Capital)
Figure 1. Float Sources and Uses
So as to include intertemporal features, some remarks must be made here
on the notation used:
- t - a, t - b, t - c : they mean that  DCFt (float) could have been nurtured by
decisions made in earlier periods. In case they were taken in the current
period “t”, we would have a  =  b  =  c  =  0.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 270
- t  + d, t  + e, t  + f : they mean that  DCFt (float) could nurture decisions
and assessments to be made in later periods. In case they were taken in
the current period “t”, we would have  d  =  e  =  f  =  0.
In latest valuation books, by free cash flows is meant a concept that defines
“the amount of cash flows that the firm can distribute to security holders”
(Benninga, page 36, 1997). This translates to cash flows brought about by
assets, as (01) showed in the standard cash flow model from Section II:
DCFt (brought about by assets) = DCFt (delivered to debtholders) +
+ DCFt (delivered to stockholders)
The internal structure of cash flows from assets were dealt in (10):
DCFt (assets) = D CFt (operative) - D CFt (working capital) -
- D CFt (fixed assets)
That is to say, free cash flows are what remains of cash flows from assets
after making provision for working capital and fixed assets current
requirements. This is the usual meaning as in up-dated valuation
methodologies. Still others, like Bennett Stewart (1991), on the side of
Economic Value Added (EVA) representatives, defines “free cash flows” as
“cash from operations that are available or attributable to both lenders and
shareholders”. It’s very close to the valuation analysts’ meaning, if we make
accurate amendments to working capital and fixed assets provisions. But it
was Jensen (1986) the first to call attention to free cash flows as vehicles of
agency problems. His definition amounts to “free cash flows are those cash
flows in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”.THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 271
It’s time to draw a comparison among these points of view and the cash
float model with float:
- In the first place, Jensen spells out not the single period standard cash
flow model but the intertemporal multi-stage standard cash flow model.
In Benninga and Stewart approaches both the single and the
multiperiodical model are suitable. As for the float model, we have seen
it is well suited to both frameworks.
- In the second place, Jensen means not only assets-in-place but also future
forecastable investments; these issues are not so clearly depicted in
Benninga or Stewart, but quite well developed in Damodaran’s latest
papers and books (see References). Nowadays, it is broadly agreed that
we need assess the value of the firm with these two dimensions in mind.
As for the float model, the revenue bond takes care of assets-in-place,
whereas the performance swap does its own job with not only forecastable
investments fut other core decisions in corporate finance. Further, our
portfolio approach allows for quantitative grounds on Jensen’s free cash
flows.
- Last of all, the cash flow model with float has a broader structure than
those frameworks which were brought about within the standard cash
flow model. On balance, if we closely look at (34) we will see that there
is more leeway there so as to deal with governance issues than in the
three approaches already surveyed.
XII. Agency Float and Arbitrage against the Model
From the preceding section, we know that the float sources are wider
than  those only provided by free cash flows which come out from operative
cash flows. Taking the matter further, it seems sound as from now to call
“agency float” any float managers set up revealing opportunistic behavior
on behalf of their own interests. Although there is a wide variance in theJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 272
ways managers bring about their agency floats, we are going to show the
most direct one, through the following float components as in (34):
DCFt (sunk costs) + DCFt (fixed assets replacement) + DRMt (rate of interest) +
+ DRMt (foreign exchange) + DRMt  (commodities)        (36)
because their amounts are likely to be swapped with the following
components:
DCFt  (strategic investments) + DCFt (tight budget constraint) +
+ DCFt (incentives)                  (37)
in this way, the managers’ float becomes eventually:
DCFt (agency float) = DCFt (strategic investments) +
+ DCFt (tight budget constraint) + DCFt (incentives)                                   (38)
Remembering here the internal structure of strategic investments cash
flows as stated in (35), we can foresee the variety of agency problems this
item really conveys:
DCFt (strategic investments) = DCFt (future diversifications) +
+ DCFt (future mergers and acqusitions) + DCFt (future reorganizations) +
+  DCFt (future capital investments) +  DCFt (going private decisions)
It should be borne in mind that we have chosen only one representation
of the agency float, among a broad set of likely choices, which stem firstlyTHE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 273
from items in (34), to be included in (36) and secondly from new debt or
stock sources.
The Arbitrage against the Model:
The agency float really conveys an arbitrage against the model. In fact,
when managers hold the floor and contrive the cash flow model with float
on behalf of their own interests, they are setting up a synthetic portfolio with
the following features:
a) No up-front personal investment is required.
b) In the very short-term, risk is kept negligible.
c) Positive returns are expected from that portfolio, conditional on the agency
managers currently picked up.
But this is a conditional-expectations financial arbitrage, as in Goetzmann
(1998).  In other words, agency problems which arise when dealing with
cash flows floats can also be regarded as a process of arbitrage against the
float model. By matching the normative float in (34) with the agency float in
(38) the gap can be operationally handled. Such is the task the normative
model will address.
XIII. The Normative Float Model
We have got the float model so far and it’s time then to make it work on
operative grounds. We should build up a device to deal with agency problems.
The float model will provide the benchmark from which to measure the gap
between the agency float with the float model. Furthermore, we require a
procedure to curb the arbitrage against the model the managers might
successfully have boiled down.  We are going to call “normative float model”
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A. The Cash Flow Model with Float.
B. The Accountability Precept
C. A twofold negotiation process
The float model has already been fully developed. Let’s go to the rules
for an accountable behaviour on the managers side.
B. The Accountability Precept:
We propose this precept as a way of including a set of requirements to be
met by managers when planning and submitting to the Board of Directors
their strategic and operational expected cash flows for incoming periods.
- Definition of the planning horizon and valuation periods must be
advanced. Furthermore, each variable coming into the cash flows should
be specified and fully explained.
- Relevant information might be provided to Directors and appointed
consultants, in order to reproduce and analyse all the assessed cash flows.
- Assumptions and computation methodology of cost of capital, cost of
debt and expected stockholders return should be developed and made
explicit.
- Valuation models chosen by managers have to be identifiable and their
assumptions uncovered.
- Strategic and planning goals should hold true not only by a judicious use
of financial forecasting models but by full disclosure of managers
conditional expectations on future cash flows.
- Agency relationships should be duly tested within the framework of goals
consistency, competitive purposes and budget feasibility.THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 275
C. The Twofold Negotiation Process:
Who should set up the normative model? The Board of Directors,
definitely. However, it seems a sound procedure to strenghten its
implementation with the help of an arbitrator. The role of an arbitrator should
be laid on auditing firms, financial consultants, notaries, law firms, or some
regulatory agency.
Managers’ arbitrage against the model triggers off negotiations between
the Board of Directors and the Management alongside two stages.
Stage 1:  Board of Directors ex-ante negotiations with the management
The float structure is agreed on ex-ante basis with the management. It
must be a careful process, taking into account that real life contracts are
unavoidable incomplete. Furthermore, as participants handle imperfect
information and their behavior becomes opportunistic, moral hazard, adverse
selection and signalling are likely to arise at this stage.
Stage 2: Board of Directors ex-post negotiations with the management
As time passes by, any discrepancy between the Normative Model and
the agency float  as used by managers, ought to be explained:
i. Either from sound and reliable decisions which managers may have taken
after the first stage finished. These events would convey noncontestable
changes in the Normative Model.
ii. Or by agency allocations of cash flows on behalf of managers interests,
and this should trigger off unavoidable negotiations with management.
Further action may include arbitrator performances, preventive
safeguards, stockholders activism, perhaps brinkmanship between the
Board and the managers, and full conflict eventually.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 276
X. Conclusions
The prevailing Standard Cash Flow Model shows an inherent flaw: it
claims that the whole of cash flows from assets should be distributed between
debtholders and stockholders period after period. Unless we could remove
such apparent shortcoming, we wouldn’t be able to deal with core financial
decision making, such as incentives, future investments, reorganization, sunk
costs, capital assets replacement, risk management, mergers and acquisitions,
just to give a short account from the many items usually involved.
The Cash Flow Model with Float overcomes such a flaw, bringing leeway
to cope with core financial decision making, within an intertemporal
framework. The model shows how any investment decision (and to a further
degree, any company valuation) can be regarded as a portfolio built upon a
revenue bond and a performance swap. The revenue bond cares for the
investment decision financing. The performance swap lies behind the likely
value enhancement provided by the project.  When addressing firm valuation
the revenue bond takes charge of assets in place and the swap is a value
driver. It is within the performance swap where we have showed that the
float handles value enhancement and deals with agency problems.
We have exhibited the complex structure that the float conveys so as to
make easier the task of dealing with facts and figures. In the paper, the float
shows itself as a decision making centre, managing an active dynamics
between sources and applications of expected cash flows.
To spell out the consequences on float cash flows from managers’
decisions, a normative float model is presented which blends the float model
with a normative accountability principle. It is when we compare those cash
flows produced by the managers’ opportunistic behavior with the cash flows
stated by the normative float model,  that we can make explicit the managers’
financial arbitrage against the float model. Agency costs are diminished when
direct negotiations take place between the Board of Directors (or appointed
trustees, or external mediators) for one side, and managers for the other.THE CASH FLOW MODEL WITH FLOAT 277
They must attempt to bridge the gap between both agency and normative
floats.
Last of all, auditors, analists, Investment Banks, Risk Rating Agencies,
and control agencies, also can diminish agency costs by means of capital
markets disciplinary mechanisms. By using this model, operative bond
covenants might be drafted either in public or in private offers.
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